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  INTRODUCTION	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  argue	  that	  Christopher	  Kutz	  misapplies	  his	  theory	  of	  joint	  action	  when	  he	  attributes	  shareowners	  responsibilities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  intentional	  participation	  in	  the	  corporations	  in	  which	  they	  invest.	  Instead	  I	  propose	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  joint	  action	  should	  be	  used	  to	  attribute	  shareowners	  responsibilities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  intentional	  participation	  in	  the	  stock	  market.	  	  	  If	   shareholders’	   accountability	   is	   grounded	   in	   their	   intentional	   participation	   in	  the	  stock	  market,	  then	  shareholders	  cannot	  take	  responsibility	  for	  corporation’s	  individual	  actions.	  Instead	  they	  are	  solely	  responsible	  for	  the	  benefits	  they	  gain	  from	  holding	  shares	  if	  these	  are	  a	  result	  of	  moral	  wrongdoing	  and	  for	  this	  they	  should	  be	  held	  accountable.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   reach	   this	   conclusion	   this	   paper	   starts	   with	   the	   concept	   of	  responsibility	   and	  of	   being	  held	   responsible	   in	   §1.	   §2	   introduces	   the	   reader	   to	  Kutz’s	   theory	   of	   responsibility,	   followed	   in	   §3	   by	   an	   explanation	   as	   to	   the	   two	  main	  ways	   in	  which	  Kutz’s	   intentional	  participation	  differs	   from	  that	  of	  others.	  Kutz’s	  argument	   for	  why	  participating	   in	   joint	  action	   leads	   to	   individuals	  being	  responsible	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  is	  presented	  in	  §4.	  	  	  In	   §§5-­‐7	   I	   argue	   that	   shareholders	   do	   not	   intentionally	   participate	   in	  corporations.	   I	   start	   by	   explaining	   how	   investors	   become	   shareholders	   in	   §5.	  Reasons	  as	  to	  why	  an	  investor	  would	  chose	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  given	  corporation	  are	  discussed	   in	   §6.	   Failing	   to	   show	   shareholders’	   intentional	   participation	   in	  corporations	   through	   exploration	   of	   the	   acquisition	   process	   or	   investors’	  motives,	   §7	   examines	   other	   reasons	   for	   which	   shareholders	   can	   be	   said	   to	  intentionally	  participate	  in	  the	  corporations	  in	  which	  they	  invest.	  	  	  My	  proposal,	  that	  we	  should	  view	  shareowners	  as	  intentionally	  participating	  in	  the	   equity	   market	   rather	   than	   in	   individual	   corporations,	   is	   presented	   in	   §	   8.	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From	  this	  it	  follows	  that	  shareowners	  become	  morally	  tainted	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  participation	   in	   the	   equity	   market,	   which	   in	   turn	   results	   in	   benefiting	   from	  wrongful	  acts.	  As	  such	  they	  become	  accountable	  for	  rectifying	  the	  wrongdoing.	  	  1.	  THE	  CONCEPT	  OF	  RESPONSIBILITY	  AND	  OF	  BEING	  HELD	  RESPONSIBLE	  	  Intuitively	   the	   term	   responsibility	   may	   evoke	   a	   negative	   connotation	   and	   be	  associated	  with	  blame,	   yet	   importantly	   can	   also	   include	  praise.	   It	   can	   relate	   to	  responsibility	   for	   past	   and	   future	   events.	   More	   often	   than	   not	   the	   issues	   of	  responsibility	   and	   being	   held	   responsible	   relates	   to	   past	   negative	   events	  attributing	  blame	  to	  an	  agent.	  In	  situations	  when	  speaking	  of	  y	  being	  responsible	  for	  x	  having	  happened,	  we	  firstly	  refer	  to	  y	  (y	  here	  being	  a	  legal	  and	  moral	  agent)	  having	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  caused	  x.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  past	  events	  an	  agent	  would	  need	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  the	  cause	  of	  x,	  where	  y	  would	  have	  had	  to	  perform	  some	  form	  of	  act	  or	  event	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  resulting	  in	  x.	  	  	  That	  y	   caused	  x	   is	  not	  by	   itself	   sufficient	   for	  y	   to	  be	   responsible	   for	  x.	   In	   these	  types	   of	   situations	   we	   tend	   to	   use	   the	   term	   responsibility	   and	   accountability	  interchangeably.	  When	  using	  the	  term	  ‘accountability’	  I	  refer	  to	  when	  an	  agent	  is	  held	   to	  account	   for	   their	  actions.	  At	   this	  point	  we	  can	  still	   argue	   that	  x	  was	  an	  accident,	  and	  thereby	  even	  though	  being	  the	  cause	  of	  x,	  y	  is	  not	  responsible	  for	  x	  in	  all	  the	  senses	  of	  the	  word,	  for	  y	  does	  not	  deserve	  to	  be	  held	  to	  account	  for	  x.	  The	  agent	  can	  here	  be	  said	  to	  be	  causally	  responsible	  for	  x,	  but	  not	  yet	  legally	  or	  morally	   responsible.	   To	   credit	   y	   with	  wider	   responsibility,	   further	   evidence	   of	  control	  is	  needed,	  i.e.	  that	  y	  was	  in	  a	  position	  to	  control	  what	  she	  was	  doing.	  Such	  control	   is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  motive,	   i.e.	   that	  y	   intended	  to	  cause	  x	  and	  that	  y	  was	  free	  to	  either	  cause	  or	  not	  to	  cause	  x.	  	  	  Yet	  even	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  motive	  and	  free	  will	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  claim	  that	  y	  is	  not	   responsible	   in	   the	   strictest	   sense.	   Take	   the	   example	   of	   a	   child	   doing	   some	  harm.	  The	   child	  may	  have	   caused	   the	  harm,	  with	   the	   intent	   to	   cause	   it,	   yet	  we	  would	  not	  want	  to	  make	  the	  child	  accountable	  in	  the	  same	  fashion	  as	  we	  would	  an	  adult,	   for	  we	  do	  not	   see	   them	  as	  having	   the	  same	   level	  of	  understanding	  or	  knowledge	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   their	   actions.	   Yet,	   lack	   of	   control,	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understanding	   or	   knowledge	   may	   free	   one	   from	  moral	   responsibility,	   but	   not	  from	  most	  legal	  responsibility.	  The	  purpose	  of	  attributing	  agents’	  moral	  or	  legal	  responsibility	   and	   accountability	   is	   often	   to	   either	   deter	   or	   encourage	   certain	  behaviour.	  However,	  we	  also	  attribute	  agents	  responsibility	  simply	  because	  we	  see	  them	  as	  deserving	  to	  be	  held	  responsible.	  	  What	  I	  have	  presented	  above	  involves	  causal,	  moral	  and	  legal	  responsibility	  that	  others	  attribute	  y	  as	  a	  result	  of	  having	  caused	  x,	  yet	  it	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	   responsibility	   that	   y	   attributes	   herself.	  When	   speaking	   of	   instances	  where	  agents	  attribute	  responsibility	  to	  themselves	  such	  instances	  are	  often	  combined	  with	   emotions	   of	   guilt,	   shame,	   pride	   or	   joy	   either	   for	   performed	   or	   omitted	  actions.	  	  	  All	  of	  the	  above	  are	  examples	  of	  individual	  responsibility,	  i.e.	  that	  an	  individual	  is	  held	  individually	  responsible	  for	  her	  own	  actions	  or	  lack	  of	  them.	  It	  does	  not	  fully	  help	   us	   understand	   how	   we	   attribute	   responsibility	   to	   individuals	   for	   harms	  caused	   by	   others.	   And	   it	   is	   this	   type	   of	   responsibility	   with	   which	   Christopher	  Kutz	  is	  concerned.	  	  	  2.	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  KUTZ’S	  THEORY	  OF	  RESPONSIBILITY	  In	   his	   Complicity:	   Ethics	   and	   Law	   for	   a	   Collective	   Age	   Kutz	   attributes	  responsibility	  to	  shareholders	  for	  the	  harm	  done	  to	  victims	  of	  corporate	  wrong	  doing.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   they	   are	  morally	   responsible	   for	   the	   actions	   that	  caused	  harm	  (Crowe	  2012:161).	  Instead	  he	  is	  claiming	  that	  shareholders	  should	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  unlimited	  repair	  demands	  if	  the	  corporations	  in	  which	  they	  are	  invested	  are	  unable	  to	  repair	  the	  damage	  themselves.	  	  	  	  Kutz	   develops	   a	   theory	   of	   responsibility	   where	   agents	   are	   individually	   held	  responsible	   for	  other	  agents’	  actions	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   complicity.	  The	  reason	   for	  Kutz	   wanting	   to	   develop	   such	   a	   joint	   action	   theory	   of	   responsibility	   is	   the	  following	  concern:	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The	  most	  important	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  harms	  and	  wrongs	  of	  contemporary	  life	   are	   the	   products	   of	   collective	   actions,	   mediated	   by	   social	   and	  institutional	   structures.	   These	   harms	   and	   wrongs	   are	   essentially	  collective	   products,	   and	   individual	   agents	   rarely	   make	   a	   difference	   to	  their	   occurrence.	   So	   long	   as	   individuals	   are	   only	   responsible	   for	   the	  effects	   they	  produce,	   then	   the	   result	  of	   this	  disparity	  between	  collective	  harm	   and	   individual	   effect	   is	   the	   disappearance	   of	   individual	  accountability.	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Kutz	  2007:	  113)	  	  Two	  examples	  of	  such	  collective	  action	  are	  collective	  and	  systematic	  rape	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  the	  disasters’	  oil	  spills	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  Delta.	  The	  first	  occurred	  across	  conquered	  Europe	  in	  1945,	  performed	  mainly	  by	  the	  Red	  Army	  as	  they	  made	  their	  way	  to	  Berlin.	  A	  crime	  sometimes	  said	  to	  be	  the	  greatest	  ever	  crime	  against	  women.	  Archbishop	  Bernard	  Griffin	  for	  example	  reported	  that,	  "In	  Vienna	   alone	   they	   raped	   100,000	  women,	   not	   once	   but	  many	   times,	   including	  girls	  not	  yet	  in	  their	  teens,	  and	  aged	  women",	  and	  some	  20%	  of	  children	  born	  in	  Berlin	  in	  1946	  are	  suspected	  to	  the	  result	  of	  rape	  (Dwork	  and	  Pelt	  2009).	  	  	  The	  oil	  spills	  are	  attributed	  to	  Exxon	  Mobil’s	  and	  Shell’s	  actions.	  More	  than	  7,000	  spills	  were	  recorded	  there	  between	  1970-­‐2000	  amounting	  to	  13	  million	  barrels	  of	   oil,	   causing	   thousands	   of	   deaths	   and	   continued	   explosions	   through	   to	   the	  present	  day.	  None	  of	  the	  affected	  individuals	  have	  yet	  been	  compensated	  (Vidal	  2010).	  
 Both	  these	  harms	  were	  only	  made	  possible	  through	  joint	  action,	  where	  it	  is	  often	  claimed	  that	  no	  one	  individual	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  disaster	  for	  a)	  the	  effect	  they	   individually	  had	  on	  the	  outcome	  was	  marginal	  and	  b)	   it	  would	  have	  occurred	  even	  if	  they	  had	  not	  taken	  part.	  	  	  Kutz	   argues	   that	   existing	   theories	   of	   responsibility	   and	   attribution	   of	  responsibility	   are	   not	   equipped	   to	   provide	   individual	   responsibility	   and	  accountability	   in	   such	   cases	   since	   they	   are	   based	   on	   the	   following	   three	  principles:	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   A.	  Individual	  Difference	  Principle:	  	  I	  am	  accountable	  for	  harm	  only	  if	  what	  I	  have	  done	  made	  a	  difference	  to	  that	  harm’s	  occurrence.	  	  	   B.	  Control	  Principle:	  I	  am	  responsible	  for	  harm	  only	  if	  I	  could	  control	  its	  occurrence.	  	   C.	  Autonomy	  Principle:	  I	   am	   not	   responsible	   for	   the	   harm	   other	   agents	   cause,	   unless	   I	   have	  induced	  or	  coerced	  those	  agents	  into	  performing	  the	  harm.	  	  	  If	  we	   restrict	   our	   concept	   of	   responsibility	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	   attribute	  accountability	   to	   the	   above	   three	   principles	   this	  would	   leave	   us	   having	   to	   say	  that	   a	   soldier	   in	   the	   earlier	   systematic	   rape	   example	   is	   not	   responsible	   for	   his	  part	  in	  the	  collective	  action.	  An	  individual	  soldier	  not	  raping	  a	  woman	  would	  not	  stop	  the	  systematic	  rape.	  One	  can	  also	  claim	  that	  one	  woman	  being	  raped	  may	  be	  said	   to	  be	   insignificant	  when	   looking	  at	   the	   larger	  situation.	  The	  soldier	  can	  be	  said	   to	   not	   have	   control	   over	   the	   occurrence	   of	   systematic	   rape	   because	   a)	   he	  was	  acting	  on	  orders,	  b)	  he	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  stop	  others	  from	  raping	  nor	  c)	   did	   he	   induce	   or	   coerce	   other	   soldiers	   to	   rape.	   He	   can	   only	   be	   said	   to	   be	  responsible	  for	  the	  single	  rape	  he	  committed,	  yet	  most	  of	  us	  would	  also	  strongly	  feel	   that	   he	   has	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   systematic	   rape	   and	   thereby	   individually	  responsible	  for	  his	  part	  in	  that	  collective	  action.	  	  In	   order	   to	   overcome	   this	   moral	   vacuum	   Kutz	   presents	   us	   with	   a	   theory	   of	  responsibility	  originating	  in	  intentional	  participation.	  We	  are	  made	  complicit	  to	  others	  wrongdoing	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  intentional	  participation.	  His	  theory	  enables	  us	   to	   justly	   attribute	   responsibility	   and	   accountability	   to	   the	   individual	   agents	  where	  collective	  action	  has	  lead	  to	  harm	  by	  drawing	  on	  intentional	  participation	  alone.	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3	  JOINT	  ACTIONS	  AND	  INTENTIONAL	  PARTICIPATION	  Kutz	   calls	   this	   theory	   a	   ‘minimalist	   conception	   (Kutz	   2007:	   90)	   of	   joint	   action.	  Like	   Shapiro	   (2007)	   and	   Bratman	   (1012),	   Kutz	   starts	   by	   looking	   at	   the	  individual’s	   reasons	   for	   participating	   in	   an	   action	   when	   determining	   if	   that	  individual	   is	  participating	  in	  a	   joint	  action.	  This	  differs	  from	  Gilbert	  (2013)	  and	  Searl	  (2010)	  who	  instead	  take	  the	  social	  phenomena	  of	  groups	  as	  their	  starting	  point.	  According	  to	  Kutz’s	  minimalist	  conception,	  all	  joint	  action	  (Kutz	  2007:	  75)	  requires	  is	   intentional	  participation,	  and	  extensional	  overlap,	  which	  I	  shall	  now	  explain.	  	  3.1.	  Intentional	  Participation	  Kutz	  claims	  that	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  act	  with	  participatory	  intention,	  such	  an	  agent	  a)	  acts	  on	  the	  conception	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  their	  part	  in	  a	  collective	  end,	  where	  b)	  a	   ‘collective	   end’	   is	   simply	   the	   object	   that	   is	   a	   causal	   project	   of	   different	  individual’s	  acts.	  A	  causal	  project	  can	  be	  a	  commitment	  to	  jointly	  paint	  a	  house,	  or	  jointly	  go	  to	  the	  movies.	  Before	  developing	  this	  idea	  any	  further	  I	  first	  want	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  concept	  of	  intentionality.	  	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  somebody	  to	  do	  something	  intentionally?	  A	  man	  raises	  his	  hand	   in	   a	   crowd,	   but	   was	   it	   intentional?	   It	   might	   involve	   him	   freely	   and	  voluntarily	  raising	  his	  hand,	  in	  which	  case	  we	  can	  say	  that	  he	  did	  so	  intentionally.	  But	  does	  this	  imply	  that	  it	  was	  his	  intention	  to	  raise	  his	  hand?	  We	  are	  unable	  to	  answer	  that	  without	  further	  information	  for	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  his	  reason	  for	  raising	  his	  hand.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  to	  provoke	  somebody’s	  attention.	  In	  which	  case	  we	  would	  say	  that	  it	  was	  not	  his	  intention	  to	  raise	  his	  hand	  as	  such,	  but	  instead	  his	   intention	  was	  to	  provoke	  attention.	  But	  how	  intentional	  was	  this	   intention?	  Did	  he	  deliberate	  about	  what	  he	  was	  going	  to	  do	  before	  doing	  it?	  Perhaps	  he	  did	  it	   because	   he	   thought	   he	   recognized	   somebody,	   but	   after	   that	   first	   impulsive	  reaction	   realized	  he	  was	  mistaken.	  We	  might	   then	  want	   to	   say	   that	  he	  did	  not	  intentionally	  provoke	   that	  person’s	  attention	  at	   all.	   So	  did	   the	  man	  who	  raised	  his	  hand	  in	  a	  crowd	  do	  so	  intentionally?	  	  	  
	   7	  
With	  the	  above	  example	  I	  show	  that	  intention	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  notions	  of	  purpose	  and	  deliberation	  (Austin	  1966).	  In	  its	  fullest	  sense	  intention	  includes	  all	  three,	   i.e.	   that	  an	  agent	  acts	   intentionally	  when	  she	  after	  deliberation	  acts	  with	  the	  intention	  and	  purpose	  of	  performing	  that	  act.	  Deliberation	  implying	  that	  we	  have	  though	  of	  our	  options	  and	  potential	  effect	  of	  our	  actions.	  Purpose	  referring	  to	  our	  motivation	  as	  to	  why	  we	  perform	  or	  refrain	  from	  performing	  a	  specific	  act.	  Kutz’s	  explanation	  as	  to	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  intentionally	  perform	  an	  act	  takes	  all	  three	  of	  these	   into	  account.	  Yet	  such	  intentions	  need	  not	  be	  made	  explicit.	  This	  lack	  of	  need	  for	  making	  intentions	  explicitly	  known	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  §4.	  	  3.2	  Extensional	  overlap	  	  Turning	   now	   to	   Kutz’s	   second	   requirement	   for	   joint	   action,	   namely	   that	   the	  individuals	   involved	   have	   sufficient	   extensional	   overlap	   in	   their	   intentional	  participation.	  Extensional	  overlap	   focuses	  on	   the	  requirement	   that	  agents	  need	  to	   have	   a	   real	   overlapping	   joint	   goal	   in	   mind	   in	   which	   they	   can	   intentionally	  participate	  in	  order	  to	  be	  said	  that	  they	  are	  acting	  jointly.	  	  	  Take	   the	   case	  where	   two	   friends	  want	   to	   go	   out	   for	   dinner	   together.	   Yet,	   one	  wants	   to	   go	   to	   a	   French	   restaurant	   and	   the	   other	   a	   Vietnamese,	   neither	   being	  willing	  to	  compromise.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  two	  have	  the	  participatory	  intention	   to	   go	   out	   to	   dinner	   together,	   but	   this	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   potential	  overlap	  of	  intentions	  rather	  than	  real	  overlap.	  Neither	  are	  willing	  to	  change	  their	  minds,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  substantial	  overlap	  in	  intentions	  to	  result	  in	  the	  two	  going	  out	  for	  dinner.	  	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   intentions	  have	   to	   overlap	   in	   a	   perfect	  manner	   to	   fulfill	  Kutz’s	   requirement.	   As	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	  more	   detail	   later	   in	   the	   paper,	   the	  agent	  for	  example	  does	  not	  have	  to	  have	  the	  intention	  to	  actually	  realize	  a	  ‘joint	  goal’;	  they	  only	  need	  to	  have	  the	  intention	  to	  contribute	  to	  it	  in	  some	  fashion.	  	  Yet	  the	   level	   of	   intention	   is	   still	   important	   when	   looking	   at	   legal	   responsibilities	  (why	   the	   switch	   to	   the	   legal?).	   One	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   have	   participatory	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intentions	   in	   one	  way	   but	   not	   in	   another	   (give	   example),	   and	   thereby	   only	   be	  held	  accountable	  for	  the	  intended	  part	  of	  a	  resulting	  action.	  	  4.	  TWO	  MAIN	  DIFFERENCES	  	  Kutz’s	   theory	  of	   joint	  action	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  others’	  (Bratman	   	  2012,	  Shapiro	   2007,	   Gilbert	   2013)	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   two	   claims.	   First,	   he	   claims	   that	  participatory	  intention	  does	  not	  require	  support	  for	  the	  end	  goal	  and,	  second,	  his	  claim	  that	  an	  agent	  does	  not	  need	  to	  communicate	  his	  intentions	  to	  others.	  	  	  Kutz	   states	   that	   an	   agent’s	   participatory	   intention	   does	   not	   require	   the	   agent	  supporting	  the	  end	  goal	  in	  itself.	  For	  example,	  an	  employee	  may	  participate	  in	  a	  corporation	  while	  being	  simply	  interested	  in	  her	  own	  job	  and	  salary.	  Yet	  through	  her	   work	   she	   may	   help	   facilitate	   the	   corporation’s	   end	   goal.	   This	   does	   not	  necessitate	   that	   the	  employee	  shares	  or	   supports	   the	  corporation’s	  end	  goal	   in	  itself.	  	  	  Kutz	   also	   does	   not	   require	   openness	   amongst	   participating	   agents	   in	   terms	   of	  intentions	   and	   shared	   reasoning	   as	   to	   how	   to	   achieve	   their	   common	   goal	  (Bratman	  2012).	  This	  lack	  of	  openness	  of	  intentions	  not	  only	  relates	  to	  explicitly	  stating	   one’s	   participation	   in	   the	   joint	   act,	   but	   also	   stating	   one’s	   own	   end	   goal	  and	  how	  one	  aims	  to	  achieve	  it.	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  changes	  to	  goals	  or	  plans	  as	  to	  how	  individuals	  intend	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals	  are	  communicated.	  As	   such,	   participants	   can	   be	   left	   in	   the	   dark	   regarding	   new	   circumstances	  entering	  the	  equation,	  which	  may	  conflict	  with	  participants’	  individual	  intentions	  or	  norms.	  	  	  Take	   the	   example	   of	   two	   men	   having	   decided	   to	   jointly	   paint	   a	   house.	   A	   is	  responsible	  for	  buying	  the	  paint	  and	  B	  buys	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  equipment.	  They	  are	  both	  in	  agreement	  as	  to	  what	  they	  need	  and	  when	  they	  need	  it	  by.	  	  As	  they	  both	  complete	   their	   part	   of	   the	   deal	   they	   go	   on	   to	   paint	   the	   house	   together.	   So	   far	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  case	  of	  a	  joint	  action.	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But	  what	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  A	  has	  bought	  stolen	  paint	  in	  order	  so	  save	  costs	  and	  did	  not	  inform	  B	  of	  this?	  According	  to	  Bratman,	  the	  decision	  as	  to	  how	  one	  was	  to	  acquire	   the	   paint	   is	   a	   sub-­‐plan	   of	   the	   joint	   action.	   As	   such	   it	   needs	   to	   be	  communicated	  between	  A	  and	  B.	  B	  was	  entitled	  to	  this	   information	  as	   it	  would	  change	  things	  significantly	  for	  him	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  B	  would	  not	  have	  chosen	  to	  paint	  the	  house	  with	  A,	  where	  he	  to	  know	  that	  A	  would	  be	  buying	  stolen	  paint.	  Is	  B	  then	  complicit	  in	  something	  unethical?	  	  	  According	  to	  Bratman	  (2012)	  and	  Shapiro	  (2007)	  he	  is	  not,	  for	  B	  would	  not	  have	  contributed	   to	   the	   joint	  action	  of	  painting	   the	  house	  had	  he	  known	  of	   the	   sub-­‐	  plan	   to	   use	   stolen	   paint.	   For	   Kutz,	   however,	   B	   is	   morally	   tainted,	   for	   it	   is	   not	  necessary	   for	   A	   to	   communicate	   all	   his	   sub-­‐plans.	   Instead	   B	   has	   to	   take	   the	  consequences	   of	   expanding	   his	   powers	   through	   joint	   cooperation,	   thereby	  risking	  that	  A	  would	  do	  something	  in	  direct	  conflict	  to	  B’s	  moral	  norms.	  	  	  How,	  then,	  is	  one	  to	  know	  others’	  intentions	  if	  these	  are	  not	  expressed	  explicitly?	  	  	  4.1	  The	  influence	  of	  Davidson	  In	   instances	   where	   intentions	   are	   not	  made	   explicit	   the	   only	   way	   to	   attribute	  individuals	   a	   participatory	   conception	   is	   through	   attributing	   them	   goals	   by	  virtue	  of	  their	  behaviour.	  	  	  Kutz	   refers	   to	   Davidson	   (1963)	   when	   looking	   at	   the	   issue	   of	   intentional	  participation.	   Davidson	   (1963)	   argued	   that	   we	   can	   make	   sense	   of	   peoples’	  behaviour	   by	   assuming	   that	   people	   act	   rationally.	   Such	   rationality	   entails	   that	  the	  reasons	  for	  agents’	  action	  are	  their	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  (Davidson	  1963:7).	  By	  taking	  this	  Davidsonian	  approach	  it	  follows	  that	  Kutz	  is	  claiming	  that	  x	  acts	  in	  a	   participatory	   way	   when,	   x	   holds	   the	   belief	   that	   they	   are	   doing	   their	   part	  towards	  a	  collective	  end,	  and	  the	  attitude	  that	  this	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  act.	  	  	  	  It	   is	  then	  the	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes,	  that	  others	  assume	  agents	  hold	  by	  analyzing	  their	   behavior	   that	   justifies	   them	   to	   attribute	   such	   agents’	   intentional	  participation.	   But	   how	   does	   Kutz	   take	   the	   step	   from	   an	   agent’s	   intention	   to	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participate	  in	  a	  joint	  action	  to	  them	  being	  personally	  responsible	  for	  what	  others	  do?	  This	  is	  the	  question	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  §5.	  	  	  	  5.	  PARTICIPATION	  MEANS	  IMPLICATION	  Kutz	   is	  concerned	  with	  attributing	  agents	  with	  responsibility	  and	  holding	  them	  accountable	  in	  cases	  where	  a	  deed	  has	  been	  performed,	  not	  where	  deeds	  might	  be,	  or	  are	  expected	   to	  be	  performed,	   in	   the	   future.	   It	   is	  mainly	  moral	  and	   legal	  responsibility	  of	  this	  sort	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  Kutz.	  What	  then	  are	  the	  differences	  between	  legal	  and	  moral	  responsibility? 	  Legal	  responsibility	   involves	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  Such	  rights	  and	  obligations	  apply	   to	   those	   recognized	  by	   law	   to	  be	  natural	   and	   legal	  persons.	  Our	  modern	  common-­‐law	   notion	   of	   criminal	   responsibility	   requires	   that	   the	   agent	  intentionally	  brought	  about	  the	  wrongful	  act,	  and	  that	  they	  did	  so	  freely,	  i.e.	  both	  
mens	  rea	   and	   an	  actus	   resus.	  Some	   other	   areas	   of	   law	   are	   less	   concerned	  with	  intentionality.	   All	   areas	   of	   law	  will	   hold	   us	   legally	   responsible	   for	   our	   actions	  irrelevant	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  law.	  	  	  Unlike	  legal	  responsibility,	  moral	  responsibility	  requires	  the	  agent	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  what	   is	   morally	   expected	   of	   them.	   Such	   expectations	   are	   far	   from	  straightforward	  as	  they	  differ	  by	  community,	  culture	  and	  religion.	  One	  must	  also	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  agent	  in	  order	  to	  be	  held	  morally	  responsible.	  For	  Kutz	  the	  term	  ‘moral	  agent’	  assumes	  metaphysical	  concepts	  of	  personhood	  requiring	  rationality	   and	   metaphysical	   libertarianism	   allowing	   for	   free	   will.	   Further	  requirements	  of	  mental	  states,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  the	  capacity	  to	  feel	  regret	  are	  not	  clear.	  	  	  As	  mentioned,	  Kutz	   not	   only	  wants	   to	   attribute	  moral	   responsibility	   to	   agents,	  but	  also	  to	  hold	  them	  accountable.	  Accountability	  here	  both	  implies	  that	  agents	  are	   aware	   of	   the	   effect	   their	   actions	   have	   had	   and	   that	   they	   are	   to	   be	   held	   to	  account	  for	  such	  effects	  by	  themselves	  and	  others.	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What	  differentiates	  Kutz’s	  model	  of	  moral	  and	  legal	  responsibility	  from	  most	   is	  that	   he	   attributes	   responsibility	   to	   individuals	   for	   the	   actions	   of	   others.	   	   He	  claims	  that	  we	  are	  justified	  in	  casting	  judgement	  on	  individuals	  for	  the	  action	  of	  others	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  intentional	  participation	  in	  a	  joint	  action. 	  Participation	  means	  implication.	  It	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  accountability	  for	  what	  others	  do.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Kutz	  2007:	  205)
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  It	   follows,	   for	   Kutz,	   that	   all	   those	   intentionally	   involved	   in	   joint	   action	   are	  inclusively	   accountable	   for	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   joint	   action.	   Yet,	   such	  responsibility	   is	   not	   necessarily	   distributed	   evenly,	   but	   rather	   takes	   the	  individuals’	  roles	  into	  account.	  	  	  Take	   the	   example	  of	   an	   athletics	   relay	   race.	   In	   a	   team	  of	   four	  only	  one	   runner	  needs	   to	  drop	  the	  baton	   in	  order	   for	   the	  whole	   team	  to	  be	  disqualified.	  That	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  four	  would	  be	  equally	  guilty	  of	  the	  disqualification,	  nor	  that	  all	  four	   contributed	   to	   the	   harm,	   but	   still	   all	   four	   are	   held	   accountable	   for	   being	  disqualified.	   	   It	   would	   still	   be	   the	   case	   that	   harsher	   judgement	   would	   be	  attributed	   to	   the	   person	   either	   dropping	   or	   handing	   over	   the	   baton,	   both	   by	  themselves	  and	  by	  others.	  	  	  	  Yet	  Kutz	  does	  not	   seem	   to	  be	  as	  willing	   to	   treat	   individual	   shareowners	   in	   the	  same	  fashion.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  he	  treats	  all	  individual	  shareowners	  identically	  irrelevant	   of	   their	   individual	   participation,	   knowledge	   or	   potential	   capacity	   to	  effect	  events.	  	  
	   Stockholders’	   intentional	   participation	   in	   the	   collective	   endeavour	   does	  not	   make	   them	   blameworthy	   –	   they	   have	   done	   nothing	   wrong	   by	  purchasing	   stock,	   nor	   have	   they	   failed	   in	   any	   way	   in	   their	   duties	   as	  shareholders	   (whatever	   those	   might	   be)	   But	   it	   does	   render	   them	  accountable	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   repair	   for	   the	   company’s	   accidents,	  when	  the	  company	  cannot	  meet	  its	  warranted	  claims.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Kutz	  2007,	  p.246)	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   12	  
The	  only	  individual	  differentiation	  that	  Kutz	  proposes	  is	  that	  such	  compensation	  should	  be	  distributed	  proportionally	  to	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  individuals	  hold.	  	  	  But	   what	   is	   this	   ‘intentional	   participation’	   that	   shareowners	   have	   committed	  themselves	   to	   and	   why	   does	   this	   make	   them	   and	   not	   others	   personally	  accountable	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   repair	   for	   a	   company’s	   accidents	   if	   the	   company	  can’t	   fulfil	   its	   obligations?	   The	   first	   step	   in	   answering	   this	   question	   relates	   to	  how	   investors	  become	  shareowners	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  §6	  provides	  more	  clarity	  on	  this	  issue.	   	  6.	  HOW	  DO	  INVESTORS	  BECOME	  SHAREOWNERS?	  Let	  me	  start	  by	  making	  it	  clear	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  using	  the	  terms	  ‘shareowners’	  and	  ‘shareholders’,	  as	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  for	  the	  two	  to	  mean	  the	  same.	  Shareowners	  are	   those	   that	  own	   the	   shares.	   I	  mean	   those	  who	  have	   the	   right	   to	   the	   income	  from	   the	   shares	   and	   those	   on	   whose	   behalf	   shares	   are	   bought.	   In	   contrast,	  shareholders	   are	   those	   that	   trade	   and	   control	   the	   voting	   right	   for	   shares.	   An	  individual	   agent	   may	   or	   may	   not	   hold	   both	   roles.	   Shareholders	   include	  institutional	   investors	   such	   as	   mutual	   funds	   and	   pension	   funds.	   Such	  institutional	   investors	   are	   rarely	   the	   owners	   of	   shares.	   Instead	   they	   are	  custodians	   who	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   owners.	   Investors	   are	   those	   that	   directly	  invest	  in	  the	  equity	  market	  either	  on	  their	  own	  or	  others’	  behalf.	  	  	  Kutz	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘shareholders’	   throughout	   his	   book.	   In	   chapter	   seven	   Kutz	  acknowledges	  that	  shareholders	  include	  direct	  investors	  as	  well	  as	  institutional	  investors	   who	   invest	   on	   others’	   behalf.	   However	   he	   does	   not	   explicitly	  differentiate	   between	   the	   two	   when	   attributing	   intentional	   participation	   or	  accountability.	  I,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  think	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  distinguish	  them	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  control	  and	  motivation.	  	  	  6.1	  Control	  at	  point	  of	  acquisition	  	  I	   start	   by	   examining	   what	   control	   shareowners	   have	   when	   determining	   what	  shares	  they	  buy.	  It	  is	  at	  the	  point	  of	  buying	  shares	  that	  investors	  can	  first	  be	  said	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  infers	  commitment	  and	  intentional	  participation	  to	  a	  
	   13	  
joint	   action.	   	  Does	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   investor	  buys	   shares	   in	   a	   given	   corporation	  entail	  that	  the	  investor	  intentionally	  participates	  in	  the	  corporation?	  To	  answer	  that	   question,	   I	   start	   by	   exploring	   if	   shareowners	   buy	   stocks	   knowingly	   and	  voluntarily.	  Whether	   shareowners	   do	   so	   is	   not	   clear	   for	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	  them.	  	  	  One	  of	   the	  biggest	   changes	   in	   the	  market	   since	   the	  1980s	   is	   the	   growth	  of	   the	  institutional	  investor	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  direct	  private	  ownership	  in	  the	  equity	  market.	   The	   table	   below	   shows	   how	   ownership	   of	   the	   US	   equities	  market	   has	  changed	  since	  the	  1990s,	  but	  similar	  changes	  to	  holdings	  have	  occurred	  globally.	  
	  Figure	  1	  	  Much	  of	  this	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  growth	  of	  corporate	  and	  state	  pension	  schemes.	  This	   has	   meant	   that	   the	   way	   in	   which	   investors	   become	   shareholders	   has	  changed	   dramatically.	   In	   §§	   6.1.1-­‐6.1.3	   I	   describe	   how	   such	   institutional	  investors	  also	  buy	  shares	  differently	  than	  private	  investors.	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6.1.1	  Index	  Funds	  In	   the	   last	   twenty	   years	   there	   has	   been	   a	   large	   increase	   in	   Index	   funds	   and	  Exchange	  Traded	  Funds,	  which	  trade	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  fashion.	  This	  trend	  can	  be	  seen	  below	  in	  figure	  2.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  2.	  When	  buying	  shares	  index	  investors	  do	  not	  buy	  one	  particular	  share,	  but	  rather	  a	  wider	  collection	  of	  shares	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  index.	  They	  are	  incapable	  of	  excluding	  any	  specific	  company	  shares	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  index.	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  is	  questionable	  if	  the	  holder	  of	  such	  index	  funds	  bought	  shares	  in	  a	  given	  corporation	  voluntarily	  or	  involuntarily.	  Aristotle	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  strict	  interpretation	  of	  ‘involuntary’	  (French	  1991:25).	  	  For	  an	  action	  to	  be	  considered	  involuntary,	   according	   to	  Aristotle,	   compulsion	   or	   ignorance	   is	   needed,	   for	   the	  act	   has	   to	   be	   such	   that	   ‘no	   one	   would	   choose	   such	   an	   act	   in	   itself’	   (French	  1991:25).	  Furthermore	  such	  an	  acts	  need	  to	  come	  with	  unacceptable	  costs	  and	  pain.	   On	   an	   Aristotelian	   conception,	   shareowners	   have	   the	   choice	   not	   to	  participate	  in	  the	  index,	  and	  so	  they	  do	  not	  become	  owners	  of	  given	  corporations	  involuntarily.	   Only	   actions	   performed	   involuntarily	   come	   free	   from	  responsibility.	   Kutz	   does	   not	   make	   it	   clear	   whether	   he	   supports	   such	   a	   strict	  interpretation	  of	   ‘involuntarily’	   or	  not.	  But	  he	  would	  need	   to	   in	  order	   to	   claim	  that	   shareholders	   voluntarily	   bought	   a	   given	   stock.	   However	   this	   alone	  would	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not	   suffice	   for	   intentional	   participation,	   as	   Kutz	  would	   also	   need	   to	   show	   that	  when	  buying	   the	   shares	   investors	   acted	  on	   the	   conception	   that	   they	   are	  doing	  their	  part	  in	  the	  collective	  end	  of	  the	  corporation.	  	  I	  look	  further	  at	  this	  in	  §	  7.	  	  6.1.2	  Fund	  managers	  and	  other	  intermediates	  What	   if	   individuals	   did	   not	   directly	   invest	   in	   the	   index,	   but	   did	   so	   through	   a	  wealth	  manager	  or	  pension	  fund?	  Kutz	  claims	  that	  such	  managers	  are	  the	  chosen	  representatives	  of	  the	  individuals,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  individuals	  take	  responsibility	  for	  what	  is	  done	  on	  their	  behalf	  (2000:	  246).	  	  	  But	  what	  about	  the	  cases	  where	  the	  individual	  lacks	  the	  freedom	  to	  chose	  a	  fund	  manager?	  This	  is	  a	  position	  that	  many	  find	  themselves	  in	  when	  trustees	  chose	  a	  fund	  manager	  for	  a	  pension	  scheme.	   	  In	  these	  instances	  it	  may	  even	  be	  that	  the	  individual	  is	  unable	  to	  find	  out	  a)	  who	  the	  specific	  fund	  manager	  is	  and	  b)	  what	  she	  is	  investing	  in	  on	  their	  behalf,	  since	  many	  fund	  managers	  are	  not	  required	  to	  publish	  their	  entire	  funds	  holdings.	  	  	  6.1.3	  Sovereign	  funds	  The	  case	   for	  sovereign	  funds	   is	  even	  more	  complicated.	  Singapore,	   for	  example	  makes	   it	   a	   legal	   requirement	   for	   citizens	   to	   invest	   a	   fixed	   proportion	   of	   their	  salary	   in	   the	   Government	   Investment	   Corporation,	   which	   mainly	   invests	   in	  indexes	   but	   is	   not	   required	   to	   disclose	   investments	   to	   unit	   holders.	   There	   are	  numerous	  similar	  sovereign	   funds	  and	   legal	   requirements	   in	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  world.	  Kutz	   cannot	   claim	   that	   such	   shareowners	  have	   acted	  on	   the	   conception	  that	   they	   are	   doing	   their	   part	   in	   a	   collective	   end	   of	   a	   specific	   corporation,	   nor	  that	  their	  actions	  are	  voluntary.	  Such	  situations	  should	   instead	  be	  compared	  to	  situations	  involving	  duress.	  	  	  I	   have	   shown	   above	   that	   it	   is	   a	   complex	   matter	   how	   shareholders	   become	  shareholders	  of	  one	  given	  corporation.	  Another	  important	  issue	  is	  that	  an	  agent’s	  intentional	   participation	   must	   also	   involve	   their	   reasons	   for	   participation.	   An	  example	   of	   such	   reasons	   could	   involve	   underlying	  motivations.	   Motivation	   for	  becoming	  a	  shareholder	  in	  a	  given	  corporation	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  §	  7.	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  7.	  WHY	  DO	  SHAREHOLDERS	  INVEST	  IN	  A	  GIVEN	  SHARE?	  	  There	   are	   vast	   numbers	   of	   motives,	   which	   lead	   investors	   to	   buy	   shares.	   For	  example,	  a	  government	  might	  consider	  national	  interests	  when	  owning	  shares	  in	  defense	   companies	   or	   utilities.	   Or	   again	   an	   investor	   might	   buy	   a	   share	   in	   a	  company	  to	  make	  their	  voice	  heard.	  Perhaps	  the	   investor	  simply	  hopes	  to	  save	  money	   for	   their	   retirement.	   The	   duration	   that	   investors	   will	   invest	   in	   a	   given	  corporation	  depends	  on	   their	  motive.	   The	   chart	   below	   shows	  how	   turnover	   of	  stocks	   has	   changed	   since	   1964.	   This	   significant	   increase	   in	   turnover	   is	  interesting	   to	   consider,	   for	   such	  a	   significant	   reduction	   in	  holding	  periods	  may	  well	  reflect	  the	  lack	  of	  investors’	  commitment	  to	  corporations	  and	  their	  goals.	  	  
	  
Source:	  Haver	  Analytics	  and	  Citi	  Research	  –	  US	  Equity	  Strategy	  Figure	  3.	  For	  simplicity’s	  sake,	   I	  am	  assuming	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  shareholders	   invest	   in	  shares	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  profit,	  either	  through	  share	  price	  increases,	  dividends	  or	   the	   combination	   thereof.	   The	   extensional	   overlap	   shareholders	   have	   with	  corporations	   is	   therefore	   their	   mutual	   interest	   in	   growing	   profits.	   This	   is	   an	  assumption	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   Kutz	   would	   object	   to.	   Yet	   even	   this	   simple	  assumption	   causes	   complications,	   especially	   when	   one	   looks	   at	   how	   investors	  value	  shares	  and	  how	  a	  given	  share	  fits	  into	  the	  larger	  investment	  picture.	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6.1	  Economic	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  Under	  economic	  theory	  a	  firm	  is	  valued	  at	  the	  discounted	  value	  of	  its	  future	  net	  cash	   receipts.	  	   The	   rate	   at	   which	   the	   cash	   flows	   are	   discounted	   is	   called	   the	  discount	  rate	  (DR).	  	  The	  firm	  value	  should	  therefore	  go	  up	  if	  the	  numerator	  (cash	  flows)	  increases	  or	  the	  denominator	  (discount	  rate)	  decreases.	  	  The	  DR,	  also	  called	  the	  cost	  of	  capital,	  is	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  the	  investors	  demand	  in	  compensation	  for	  making	  their	  funds	  available	  to	  the	  firm.	  	  The	  DR	  depends	  on	  perceived	   risk	   and	   is	   mainly	   impacted	   by	   macro-­‐economic	   assumptions.	   	   The	  share	  price	  is	  very	  sensitive	  to	  these	  assumptions,	  more	  so	  than	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  numerator.	  	  	  	  6.2	  Alternatives	  to	  the	  economic	  theory	  of	  the	  firm	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  are	  large	  proportion	  of	  shareholders	  do	  not	  directly	  invest	  in	  a	  share	  but	  rather	  in	  some	  collective	  vehicle	  like	  an	  index	  fund.	  Further,	  there	  are	  large	  proportions	  of	  investors	  that	  do	  not	  reason	  in	  the	  fashion	  expressed	  above	  when	  directly	  investing	  in	  shares.	  	  These	  investors	  trade	  on	  criteria	  not	  directly	  linked	   to	   the	   valuation	  of	   a	   corporation.	   Some	   investors	   simply	  buy	   shares	   for	  risk	  and	  diversification	  purposes.	  Such	  a	  scenario	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  our	  assumption	   that	   shareholders	   are	   motivated	   by	   growing	   returns	   but	   at	   the	  portfolio	   level	   rather	   than	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   individual	   corporation.	   We	   can	  include	  macro	   investors	  here.	  Macro	   Investors	  often	  buy	   into	   long-­‐term	   trends	  such	  as	  demographics.	  What	  matters	   to	   them	  is	   the	  economic	  sensitivity	  of	   the	  share	  to	  their	  theme	  or	  in	  insuring	  against	  the	  situation	  that	  they	  may	  be	  wrong	  in	  their	  views.	  We	  also	  have	  the	  technical	  investor	  who	  looks	  to	  exploit	  patterns	  and	   behaviours.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   group	   that	   you	   will	   find	   day	   traders	   and	   high	  frequency	  traders,	  which	  are	  now	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  market.	  	  	  
	  A	   further	  problem	  with	   the	  economic	   theory	  of	   the	   firm	  is	   that	   is	  presupposes	  rational	   behaviour.	  We	   know	   from	   episodes	   such	   as	   1999-­‐2000	   that	   investors	  suffer	   from	  crowding	  behavior,	   following	   the	   last	   buyer	   in	   the	  hope	  of	  making	  money.	  	  The	  recent	  financial	  crisis	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  result	  of	  crowding	  but	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for	   the	  opposite	  reasons.	   Investors	  were	  selling	  shares	   in	  2008	  and	  early	  2009	  fearing	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  all	  these	  groups	  we	  might	  altogether	  be	  left	  with	  under	  a	  quarter	  of	  investors	   who	   try	   to	   evaluate	  the	   company	   plans	   and	   therefore	   be	   said	   to	  intentionally	  participate	  in	  the	  corporation.	  This	  is	  true	  when	  looking	  at	  how	  and	  why	   investors	   buy	   shares.	   But	   are	   there	   any	   other	   criteria	   that	   Kutz	   could	   be	  focusing	  on	  when	  attributing	  shareholders	  intentional	  participation?	  
7.	  OTHER	  POTENTIAL	  CRITERIA	  FOR	  INTENTIONAL	  PARTICIPATION	  
According	  to	  Kutz:	  
The	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  a	  participatory	   intention,	   then,	   lies	   in	   the	  form	  of	  relationship	  between	  individual	  act	  performed	  and	  the	  group	  act	  or	  outcome	  that	  rationalizes	  the	  part.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Kutz	  2007:82)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	  
He	   goes	   on	   to	   introduce	   three	   types	   of	   relationships;	   expressive,	   contibutional	  and	  normative.	  Expressive	  relationships	  are	  when	  an	  individual	  explicitly	  shows	  participation	   through	   membership	   in	   a	   group.	   Take	   the	   example	   of	   party	  members;	   they	   might	   express	   a	   relationship	   to	   a	   political	   party	   by	   becoming	  members.	   However	   the	   same	   individual	   may	   be	   attributed	   participation	   by	  having	   a	   contributional	   relationship	   to	   the	   party.	   A	   contributional	   relationship	  holds	  if	  what	  one	  does	  helps	  cause	  the	  collective	  outcome.	  The	  individual	  may	  be	  seen	   as	   having	   a	   contributional	   relationship	   to	   the	   party	   by	   voting	   for	   it	   in	   a	  general	  election.	  And	  normative	  relationships	  are	  when	  one	  performs	  one’s	  part	  because	   of	   norms	   internal	   to	   some	   group	   or	   institution	   that	   demand	   certain	  behavior.	   Take	   the	   example	   of	   a	   labour	   MP	   not	   wearing	   a	   blue	   tie	   while	  representing	  the	  party,	  as	  a	  blue	  tie	  is	  associated	  to	  the	  conservative	  party.	  	  Shareholders	  may	  behave	  in	  a	  given	  way	  because	  this	  is	  expected	  of	  them,	  such	  as	  raise	  their	  hand	  when	  voting	  rather	  than	  hand	  in	  their	  vote	  in	  a	  secret	  ballot.	  But	   does	   such	   behavior	   imply	   that	   they	   are	   intentionally	   participating	   in	  corporations	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   should	   be	   held	   responsible	   for	   their	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wrongdoing.	  If	  anything	  it	  should	  be	  fact	  that	  they	  vote,	  and	  not	  in	  what	  fashion	  that	   attribute	   shareholders	   responsibilities.	   	   Instead	   we	   should	   focus	   on	  exploring	   whether	   shareowners	   can	   claimed	   to	   have	   an	   expressive	   or	  contributional	  relationship	  to	  corporations.	  7.1	  Expressive	  relationship	  Shareholders	  could	  be	  said	   to	  have	  an	  expressive	  relationship	   to	  a	  corporation	  by	  virtue	  of	  buying	  shares	  in	  a	  corporation.	  	  This	  was	  discussed	  in	  §§	  5	  and	  6	  and	  claimed	   to	   be	   an	   insufficient	   reason.	   	   But	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   hold	   an	   expressive	  relationship	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  shareholder	  rather	  than	  a	  buyer?	  	  	  Kutz	  might	  argue	  that	   it	   is	   irrelevant	  how	  shareholders	  acquire	  the	  shares.	  The	  fact	  remains	  that	   in	  virtue	  of	  owning	  such	  shares	  they	  have	  acquired	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations,	  which	  comes	  with	  ownership	  of	   the	   firm,	   the	  role	  of	  principal,	  voting	  rights	  and	  being	  the	  main	  beneficiary	  	  	  The	   above	   are	   all	   attributes	   that	   Kutz	   refers	   to	   when	   speaking	   about	  shareholders.	  One	  can	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  by	  such	  rights	  and	  obligations	  shareholders	  become	   engaged	   in	   an	   expressive	   relationship	   with	   the	   corporation.	   For	   it	   is	  through	  rights	  and	  obligations	   that	  one	  acquires	  membership,	  and	  not	   through	  the	  acquisition	  process.	  	  	  7.1.1	  Ownership	  of	  the	  firm:	  Many	   assume	   that	   shareholders	   are	   owners	   of	   the	   firm.	   But	   this	   is	   false.	  Corporations	  are	  legal	  agents,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  own	  themselves,	  just	  as	  a	  human	  would	   (Stout	  2012:	  37).	  Shareholders	  are	  owners	  of	   shares,	  an	  ownership	   that	  gives	  them	  limited	  rights,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  shareholder	  resolutions	  and	  the	  right	  to	  a	  dividend,	  should	  the	  board	  decide	  to	  pay	  one.	  	  	  What	   then	   does	   it	   mean	   to	   own	   a	   firm?	   In	   his	   ‘Distributive	   Justice	   and	  Ownership’	  Christman	  proposes	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ownership	  should	  be	  divided	  into	  the	  right	  to	  control	  the	  asset	  and	  the	  rights	  to	  trade	  and	  gain	  income	  from	  it	  (1994:	   240).	   §§	   7.1.2	   and	   7.1.3	   below	  will	   focus	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   control,	  while	  §7.1.4	  discusses	  the	  right	  to	  gain	  income	  from	  shares.	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7.1.2	  The	  role	  of	  Principal:	  The	   idea	   that	   shareholders	   are	   principals	   and	   managers	   are	   their	   agents	   was	  adopted	   by	   many	   after	   Jensen	   and	   Meckling	   published	   their	   1976	   paper.	   The	  legal	  term	  ‘principal’	  refers	  to	  a	  person	  who	  empowers	  another	  to	  act	  as	  his	  or	  her	   representative.	   For	   example,	   shareholders	   may	   choose	   and	   empower	   a	  director	  to	  act	  on	  their	  behalf.	   In	  order	  to	   issue	  shares	  a	  corporation	  must	  first	  exist,	  which	  presumes	  there	  being	  a	  board	  of	  directors.	   	   	  It	  is	  then	  the	  directors	  who	  facilitate	  the	  issuance	  of	  shares.	  	  Nor	  do	  boards	  of	  directors	  act	  on	  investors’	  behalf	  alone.	  Instead	  they	  are	  legally	  obliged	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  corporations	  as	   a	   whole.	   Unless	   one	   wants	   to	   claim	   that	   shareholders	   are	   the	   corporation,	  shareholders	  do	  not	  hold	   the	   role	  of	  principal.	  However,	   in	  his	   review	  of	  Kutz,	  Larry	  May	  (2002:486)	  introduces	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  what	  Kutz	  attempts	  to	   do	   when	   saying	   that	   ‘Corporations	   are	   constituted	   by	   their	   shareholders’	  (Kutz	  2000:252).	  This	  could	  imply	  that	  Kutz	  does	  indeed	  claim	  that	  shareholders	  are	  the	  corporation.	   	  7.1.3	  Voting	  rights:	  Shareholders	  of	  common	  stock	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  on	  shareholder	  resolutions.	  But	  boards	  of	  directors	  in	  the	  US	  are	  not	  legally	  obliged	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  such	  votes.	  Exactly	  what	  is	  covered	  in	  such	  shareholder	  resolutions	  depends	  to	  a	  great	   deal	   on	   the	   bylaws	   of	   the	   corporations.	   Furthermore,	   only	   a	  minority	   of	  shareholders	  seem	  to	  value	  this	  right	  to	  vote	  or	  its	  effectiveness,	  as	  few	  choose	  to	  vote	  in	  shareholder	  resolutions.	  	  	  Additional	  complications	  occur	  when	  looking	  at	   institutional	   investors.	  In	  these	  circumstances	   it	   is	   not	   the	   shareowner	   that	   posses	   voting	   rights	   but	   the	  institutional	   investors.	   Nor	   is	   it	   legally	   required	   for	   institutional	   investors	   to	  report	  on	  how	  they	  vote	  on	  individual	  issues.	  This	  is	  something	  that	  is	  about	  to	  change	  with	  new	  regulations	  entering	   in	   the	  UK	  over	   the	  next	   couple	  of	   years.	  Institutional	  investors	  will	  in	  the	  future	  need	  to	  declare	  their	  votes.	  The	  current	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  that	  one	  even	   is	  a	  shareowner	  undermines	  Kutz’s	  claim	  that	  shareowners	  hold	   the	  belief	  that	   they	   are	  doing	   their	  part	   towards	   a	   collective	  end,	  and	  the	  attitude	  that	  this	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  act	  
	   21	  
Furthermore,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  institutional	  investors	  outsource	  their	  voting	  decisions	   to	   intermediate	   consultants	   such	   as	   for	   example	   the	   Institutional	  Shareholder	  Services	   (ISS).	  The	   investors	  using	   such	   services	  do	  not	  decide	  on	  how	  to	  vote,	  but	  simply	  vote	  according	  to	  ISS	  recommendations.	  This	  is	  true	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  institutional	  investors	  in	  the	  US.	  In	  these	  circumstances	  the	  decision	  on	   how	   to	   vote	   is	   further	   removed	   from	   the	   shareowners.	   This	   makes	   an	  expressive	   relationship	  between	  shareowners	  and	  corporations	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  voting	  rights	  even	  less	  likely.	  	  7.1.4	  Main	  beneficiary:	  Kutz	  argues	  that	  shareholders	  are	  the	  main	  beneficiaries	  of	  corporations’	  actions	  (2007:251).	   Bondholders	   or	   banks	   get	   a	   set	   interest	   rate	   on	   their	   investment,	  while	   shareholders’	   have	   unlimited	   upside.	   Kutz	   seems	   to	   ignore	   the	   fact	   that	  stockholders	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   lose	   their	   full,	   or	  part	   of,	   their	   investment	   in	   a	  given	  investment	  than	  other	  lenders.	  	  A	  company	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  in	  financial	  trouble	   or	  be	  unable	   to	  honour	   its	   debts	   in	   order	   for	   a	   share	  price	   to	   fall.	   The	  only	  time	  that	  shareholders	  can	  truly	  be	  said	  to	  be	  main	  beneficiaries	  is	  in	  their	  role	  as	  residual	  claimants	  (Stout	  2012,	  p.39).	  Even	  such	  residual	  claims	  in	  public	  corporations	   only	   apply	   after	   all	   other	   legal	   and	   contractual	   obligations	   have	  been	  met.	  	  	  Based	  on	  the	  points	  above	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  shareholders	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  an	  expressive	   relationship	   to	   a	   corporation	   by	   virtue	   of	   owning	   shares	   in	   a	  corporation	   to	   the	   extent	  needed	   to	   attribute	   them	   intentional	   participation	   in	  line	  with	  Kutz’s	  theory.	  	  	  7.2	  Contributional	  Relationship	  There	   are	   at	   least	   three	   ways	   in	   which	   shareholders	   may	   help	   the	   collective	  outcome:	  shareholders	  as	  lenders	  may	  help	  facilitate	  projects;	  shareholders	  may	  condone	  management	   behaviour;	   and	   shareholders	  may	   facilitate	  mergers	   and	  acquisitions	  through	  keeping	  share	  prices	  high.	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7.2.1	  Shareholders	  as	  lenders	  help	  facilitate	  projects	  In	  his	  paper	  Sandbu	  (2012)	  discusses	  whether	  we	  should	  look	  at	  shareowners	  as	  lenders	  that	  not	  only	  facilitate	  projects,	  but	  in	  addition	  do	  not	  require	  to	  be	  paid	  back	  at	  a	  given	  time,	  or	  inflict	  restrictions	  on	  how	  the	  loan	  ought	  to	  be	  used	  by	  the	  corporation.	  But	  how	  can	  Sandbu	  be	  talking	  of	  shareowners	  as	  lenders,	  when	  the	  only	  time	  that	  money	  goes	  from	  shareowners	  to	  corporations	  is	  at	  the	  point	  of	  a	  new	  issue.	  No	  shares	  traded	  in	  the	  secondary	  market	  provide	  corporations	  with	  cash.	  Furthermore	  an	   increasing	  number	  of	   initial	  public	  offerings	  are	  not	  done	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   raising	  cash	   for	   future	  projects,	  but	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  allowing	   founders	   to	   ‘cash	  out’.	  Cashing	  out	  means	   that	   the	   founders	  make	   the	  corporation	  public	  not	  because	  it	  is	  in	  need	  of	  funds	  for	  further	  investments,	  but	  because	  the	   founders	  want	  to	  benefit	   from	  current	  valuations	  and	  expectations	  on	  the	  corporations.	  	  	  7.2.2	  Shareholders	  condoning	  management	  behavior	  Another	   argument	   for	   why	   shareowners	   have	   a	   contributional	   relationship	   to	  corporations	   may	   be	   that	   through	   investing	   in	   shares	   shareholders	   condone	  management	  actions	  and	  plans,	   thereby	  providing	  a	  sense	  of	   legitimization	  and	  encouragement.	   This	   might	   be	   the	   case	   if	   investors	   invested	   according	   to	   net	  present	   value	   theories.	   But	   as	  we	   have	   seen	   in	   §3,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   for	   the	  majority	  of	  shareholders.	  Neither	  do	  most	  managers	  think	  that	  share	  prices	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  them	  doing	  a	  good	  job.	  	  	   	  7.2.3	  Shareholders	  facilitate	  M&A	  through	  keeping	  share	  prices	  high.	  Facilitating	  M&A	  might	   be	   the	   one	   thing	   that	   shareholders	   could	   justifiably	   be	  judged	   to	   be	   guilty	   of.	   When	   demand	   outstrips	   supply	   for	   stock,	   share	   prices	  increase.	  If	  shareholders	  on	  mass	  choose	  to	  sell	  stock,	  they	  would	  through	  their	  actions	   reduce	   the	   share	  price.	  The	   same	  applies	  when	   investors	  buy	  on	  mass,	  this	  causes	  the	  share	  price	  to	  increase.	  With	  higher	  share	  prices	  corporations	  can	  issue	   new	   stock	   at	   these	   higher	   prices	   in	   order	   to,	   for	   example,	   acquire	   other	  companies	  or	  simply	  to	  get	  a	  favorable	  proportion	  in	  a	  merger	  due	  to	  their	  high	  valuation.	   A	   high	   valuation	  may	   also	   stop	   them	   from	   being	   acquired,	   allowing	  management	   to	   continue	   acting	   in	   the	   same	   fashion.	   	   A	   shareholder	   wants	   a	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higher	   price,	   which	   in	   turn	   would	   provide	   management	   with	   a	   potential	  advantage.	   	  Without	  wanting	  to	  undermine	  the	  responsibility	  shareholders	  may	  play	   in	   this,	  M&A	  activity	   is	  not	  what	  determines	   the	  majority	  of	   corporations’	  actions	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	   there	  are	  not	  sectors	   that	  are	  more	   prone	   to	   M&A	   activity	   being	   part	   of	   their	   business	   model	   than	   others.	  Rather,	   I	   claim	   that	   this	   type	   of	   contributional	   relationship	   is	   insufficient	   to	  attribute	   shareholders	   participatory	   intentions,	   if	   intentional	   participation	  requires	   shareowners’	   doing	   their	   part	   in	   a	   collective	   end	   of	   a	   specific	  corporation.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  concluded	  from	  §§	  7.2.1	  and	  7.2.2.	  	  	  In	   this	   paper	   I	   have	   shown	   that	  we	   are	   not	   justified	   in	   attributing	   intentional	  participation	   in	   corporations	   to	   shareowners.	   Now	   I	  will	   propose	   that	  we	   can	  instead	  attribute	  to	  shareowners	  intentional	  participation	  in	  the	  equities	  market.	  	  	  8.	   ATTRIBUTING	   SHAREHOLDERS	   INTENTIONAL	   PARTICIPATION	   IN	   THE	  EQUITIES	  MARKET.	  	  When	  criticizing	  Kutz’s	  application	  of	  his	   theory,	   I	  have	  not	  been	  criticizing	  his	  theory	   of	   complicity,	   nor	   his	   requirements	   for	   what	   it	   means	   to	   intentionally	  participate	  as	  such.	  Instead	  I	  object	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  shareholders	  intentionally	  participate	  in	  corporations	  in	  which	  they	  invest.	  Therefore	  I	  cannot	  support	  his	  conclusion	   that	   shareholders	   are	   accountable	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   repair	   for	   the	  company’s	  accidents.	  	  	  Instead	   I	   want	   to	   propose	   the	   following,	   while	   utilizing	   Kutz’s	   theory	   of	  complicity	  in	  wrongdoing.	  	  
Intentional	  participation	  means	   implication.	   It	   is	   the	  basis	  of	   accountability	   for	  what	  others	  do.	  What	  makes	  my	  behavior	  participatory	  is	  that	  my	  conception	  of	  what	   I	  do	   is	   related	   to	   the	  group	  act,	  whether	   that	  conception	   is	  explicit	   in	  my	  deliberations,	   or	   functionally	   implicit	   in	  my	   actual	   or	   counterfactual	   behavior..	  Shareholders	   intentionally	   participate	   in	   equity	   markets	   when	   they	   invest	   in	  shares	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   last	   statement.	   Equity	   markets	   reward	   profits,	  whether	   those	   profits	   have	   been	   gained	   through	   moral	   actions	   or	   not.	   What	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matters	   to	   the	   equity	   market	   is	   that	   the	   profits	   are	   sustainable.	   Enjoying	   a	  tainted	  benefit	  puts	  one	  in	  an	  ongoing	  relationship	  with	  a	  wrongful	  act.	  It	  forces	  the	   realization	   that	   one	   has	   been	   willing	   to	   trade	   principles	   for	   benefits.	  Therefore	   shareholders	   are	   morally	   tainted	   when	   they	   benefit	   from	   wrongful	  acts,	  and	  are	  accountable	  for	  rectifying	  the	  situation.	  	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  shareholders	  have	  an	  expressive	  relationship	  to	  the	  equity	  market,	  which	  is	  stipulated	  by	  membership	  in	  a	  group,	  as	  I	  go	  on	  to	  show	  below.	  	  	  8.1	  Difference	  between	  entering	  the	  equity	  market	  and	  individual	  shares.	  To	  determine	  whether	  investors	  intentionally	  participate	  in	  the	  equity	  market	  I	  must	   first	   explain	   how	   shareowners	   voluntarily	   enter	   the	   equity	   market.	  Shareowners	   buy	   into	   the	   equity	  market	   in	   a	   similar	   fashion	   as	   they	   buy	   into	  individual	  shares.	  This	  includes	  direct	  participation	  in	  the	  equity	  market,	  as	  well	  as	   indirect	   investment	  methods	   such	   as	   index	   funds,	   fund	  managers	   and	  other	  intermediates	  and	  sovereign	   funds.	  But	  how	  can	   investors	  voluntarily	  buy	   into	  the	   equity	   market,	   when	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   they	   voluntarily	   buy	   into	  individual	   shares?	   The	   difference	   would	   involve	   how	   much	   control	   and	  knowledge	  investors	  possess	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  final	  outcome.	  If	  investors	  choose	  to	  enter	  the	  equity	  market	  through	  index	  funds	  or	  through	  other	  intermediates,	  knowledge	   of	   whether	   they	   enter	   the	   equity	   market	   is	   clear.	   This,	   as	   I	   have	  shown	   in	   §6,	   is	   not	   the	   same	   for	   individual	   shares.	   The	   options	   to	   act	   do	   not	  differ	   between	   participating	   in	   a	   give	   corporation	   and	   the	   equity	   market,	   nor	  does	  the	  potential	  cost	  of	  that	  choice.	  For	  whether	  investors	  invest	  in	  the	  market	  or	  in	  individual	  shares,	  the	  two	  options	  open	  to	  them	  are	  either	  to	  invest	  or	  not.	  Furthermore	   this	  decision	  has	   to	  be	  made	  at	   the	   same	  stage	  of	   the	   investment	  process,	  namely	  at	  the	  point	  of	  deciding	  whether	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  market	  or	  not.	  This	   is	  because,	  even	   though	   there	  are	  more	  steps	   in	   the	  chain	  of	  events	  when	  investing	   in	   individual	   shares,	   there	   are	   no	   further	   points	   at	   which	   investors	  have	   a	   choice.	   Control	   then	   comes	   down	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   numbers	   of	   chains	   of	  events	  between	  the	  point	  at	  which	  investors	  take	  an	  active	  decision	  to	  invest	  and	  the	  final	  outcome.	  Increased	  control	  and	  knowledge	  thereby	  results	  from	  a	  lower	  number	  of	  chains	  of	  events,	  and	  thereby	  a	  lower	  number	  of	  unknown	  outcomes.	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Furthermore,	  it	  is	  this	  increase	  of	  control	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	   actions	   that	   I	   claim	   provides	   investors	   with	   a	   stronger	   intention	   to	  participate	   in	   the	   equity	   market	   than	   in	   individual	   shares.	   Obviously,	   more	  deserves	  to	  be	  said	  on	  this	  topic,	  but	  it	  will	  not	  be	  said	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  	  The	   circumstances	   surrounding	   sovereign	   funds	   remains	   the	   same	   in	   both	  scenarios,	   for	   investors	  still	  do	  not	  have	   the	  choice	  as	   to	  whether	   they	  want	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  equity	  market	  or	  not.	   Furthermore	   the	  valuation	  grounds	  on	  which	  investor	  chose	  to	  invest	  in	  individual	  investment	  options,	  as	  presented	  in	  §6,	  become	  irrelevant	  as	  all	  that	  matters	  is	  participation	  in	  the	  equity	  market.	  	  	  	  8.2	  Equity	  market	  participants	  and	  ‘playing	  their	  role’	  in	  the	  end	  goal.	  The	   end	   goal	   of	   the	   equity	   market	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   structured	   and	   liquid	  environment	   to	  buy	  and	   sell	   stocks.	   Investors	  play	  a	   role	   in	   achieving	   this	   end	  goal	  by	   simply	  buying	  and	   selling	   stocks	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  market’s	   legal	  structure.	   Therefore	   the	   requirement	   for	   intentional	   participation,	   that	  shareowners	  acts	  on	  the	  conception	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  their	  part	  in	  a	  collective	  end	  (Kutz	  2000:108)	  is	  satisfied	  is	  achieved	  	  	  8.3	  For	  what	  would	  the	  shareholders	  be	  responsible?	  	  If	  shareholders’	  accountability	  is	  justified	  by	  their	  intentional	  participation	  in	  the	  equity	  market,	   then	   shareholders	   cannot	   take	   responsibility	   for	   the	   individual	  actions	  of	  a	  corporation.	  Instead	  they	  are	  solely	  responsible	  for	  the	  benefits	  they	  gain	  from	  holding	  shares	  if	  these	  are	  a	  result	  of	  moral	  or	  legal	  wrongdoing.	  Even	  though	  such	  wrong	  doings	  are	  a	  result	  of	  what	  we	  unintentionally	  do	  together	  as	  a	   group,	   with	   we	   have	   no	   sense	   of	   togetherness,	   and	   where	   our	   individual	  ‘actions	  reach	  beyond	  intentions’	  (Williams	  2002:206).	  	  	  What	  might	  such	  an	  instance	  mean	  in	  practice?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  recent	  financial	  crisis,	  for	  example,	  shareholders	  that	  benefitted	  from	  banks’	  wrongdoing	  would	  be	  required	  to	  compensate	  taxpayers	  for	  having	  to	  bail	  out	  the	  banks	  up	  to	  and	  including	  the	  benefits	  they	  had	  gained	  during	  the	  banks’	  wrongdoing.	  This	  would	  not	   reduce	   the	   responsibilities	   that	   individual	   corporations	   have	   for	   their	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